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What is Voluntary? What is Required? And What is Florida Statute § 766.1065?
I.

Introduction
What is voluntary? What is required? While this question is often one reserved to

undergraduate philosophy classes, it can often have a place in the law as well. If you are injured,
do you have a right to seek recourse in a court of law? Most people would argue yes; our entire
civil court system is founded upon the premise of making people whole when they are injured,
be it physically or in their pursuit of business, for example. But, if in order to exercise that right
in your state’s court system, you were required to waive other rights, like your right to privacy,
for example, would that waiver truly be voluntary, or would it simply be required?
Several states have recently enacted legislation that requires a litigant to make such a
choice when filing a medical malpractice suit. They do so by requiring potential plaintiffs to
waive their right to privacy in their health care records under HIPAA, the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act, in order to allow for ex parte investigation and
communication between defendants and insurers, as well as the patients’ other health care
providers. Most importantly these laws require that the names of all health care providers visited
within a period prior to the action be listed by a potential litigant, whether relevant or not to the
claim itself. 1 The cost of not providing authorization for such disclosures is to be barred entirely
from bringing suit. These statutes essentially require litigants to make a choice – waive their
right to privacy, or find redress elsewhere.
The most recent statute to pass a state legislature was enacted in Florida in 2013. Florida
Statute § 766.1065, in its broadest terms, operates as described above. However, it has the
distinction of being the first of such statutes to be challenged not only before a federal district
court, but also before a federal circuit court. The most important issue analyzed by both courts is
1

Fl. Stat. § 766.1065(3).

whether the law is preempted by the HIPAA Privacy Rule, 2 which requires a knowing, voluntary
and intelligent waiver of protected information. At its most basic level, however, the court was
called upon to interpret what is voluntary, and what is required.
In order to better understand the context of the courts’ decisions, a significant amount of
background is required. Section II of this paper provides such a background, beginning with
Texas’ experience with a similar statute and a similar challenge in it State Supreme Court.
Following a discussion of the forerunners to the Florida statute, a short background of the law
and pre-existing notice provisions for medical malpractice suits in the state of Florida are
provided.
Sections III and IV of this comment deal specifically with Murphy v. Dulay, as decided in
the District Court and Eleventh Circuit, respectively. Because the decisions tackle the exact
same issues, yet come to very different results, the courts’ reasoning is explained at substantial
length. Section V of this comment discusses both decisions, and why the District Court was
correct to hold that HIPAA’s privacy rule pre-empts the Florida Statute. Section VI further
argues that § 766.1065 violates a potential claimant’s right to a trial by jury, under both the
United States and Florida State constitutions. Section VII summarizes these arguments and offers
conclusions.
II.

The Law
A. Forerunners: In re Collins, M.D. and Texas
Florida Statute § 766.1065 is not the first statute of its kind to become operative, or to

face judicial scrutiny. In 2003, Texas enacted section 74.052 of the Civil Practice and Remedies
Code in an attempt to decrease what it viewed as rising medical costs, and a lack of availability
of basic services to some of its citizens, by decreasing the costs of medical malpractice claims to
2

45 CFR § 164.508.

providers. 3 The Texas statute operates by requiring a potential plaintiff to a uthorize disclosure of
relevant, privileged information (both written and verbal) sixty days before filing suit in order to
allow for investigation of claims by defendants and insurers, allowing for the settling of
meritorious claims. 4 Importantly, subsection (c) of the statute states that any authorization must
comply with Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act5 ,
By 2009, a challenge to this law had reached the Texas Supreme Court, in the form of In
Re Collins. 6 The case involved a plaintiff whose claim arose from a failure of her doctor, Dr.
Lester Collins, to diagnose nasopharyngeal carcinoma for over two years, until her primary care
physician discovered the cancer had reached stage IV, and was therefore inoperable. 7 Although
the plaintiff complied with the Texas Statute by submitting her authorization pre-suit, several
months later, and following receipt of defendant’s answer, she sought a protective order from the
court barring defendant from ex parte communications with her physicians. 8 Her primary
concern was that defendant would abuse the ability to conduct ex parte interviews in order to
gain verbal information not reflected in the health records, and subsequently engage in “trial-byambush,” using the information to elicit the opinions of health care providers at trial. 9 Both the
trial court and the Court of Appeals agreed that such verbal information had the potential to
create abuses, and granted (or upheld) the protective order. 10
The defendant appealed to the Supreme Court of Texas, through a writ of mandamus, in
order to challenge the issuance of the protective order. 11 The Texas Supreme Court first noted
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In re Collins, 286 S.W.3d 911, 916 (Tex. 2009); Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 74.052.
In re Collins, supra, 286 S.W.3d at, 916 (Tex. 2009); Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 74.052.
5 45 CFR § 164.508 (See subsection D below).
6 In re Collins, 286 S.W.3d 911.
7 Id. at 912.
8 Id. at 913-914.
9 Id. at 914.
10 Ibid.
11 Id. at 912.
4

that the legislative mandate clearly allowed for the use of verbal communicatio n obtained in ex
parte interviews. 12 It went further, however, and stated that under the Act patients are the
gatekeepers to their own information, in that they can determine who and what is relevant, and
delineate within the authorization which providers can be contacted. 13 Finally, the court
dismissed plaintiff’s claim that HIPAA pre-empted the act due to the requirement of authorizing
disclosure in order to file the lawsuit. 14 It stated that the act took its authorization requirements
verbatim from HIPAA, and that the authorization was voluntary - the plaintiff chose to sue.15
Although this case mainly dealt with the issuance of a protective order, it nonetheless
brings forward many of the issues that would confront the District Court and the Eleventh Circ uit
several years later.

Major differences also would present themselves in the nature of the

disclosures, in that the sixty-day window had already been completed in this case, where, as we
will see later, Murphy’s suit was much earlier procedurally. Additionally, the Florida statute
requires that potential claimants not only disclose relevant information, but also reveal the names
of healthcare providers who are irrelevant to the allegations, and certify them as such. 16
Nonetheless, the major themes are present: How voluntary is a waiver if it is a requirement to file
suit? And, how does HIPAA affect such acts?
B. – Florida Medical Malpractice Procedure
Procedures to files suit in Florida for medical malpractice cases are often complex, and
driven primarily by the goal of giving notice to both the prospective defendants and their
insurers 17 , as embodied in provisions such as Fl. Stat. § 766.106 et. seq. This notice comes in

12

Id. at 918.
Ibid.
14 Id. at 920.
15 Ibid.
16 Fl. Stat. § 766.1065(3).
17 Fl. Stat. § 766.102 et. seq.; 36 Fla. Jur 2d Medical Malpractice § 69.
13

multiple waves, from initial contact between the parties, to pre-discovery investigations, to
expert affidavits, which must accompany the initial volley of court filings should a case move
forward.18
Persons seeking to file a complaint for medical negligence must first notify each
prospective defendant, in the manner prescribed by statute, of their intent to initiate litigation.19
The above notice is then supplemented following completion of a pre-suit investigation by the
plaintiff, which essentially announces the claimant’s intent to move forward and initiate
litigation for medical negligence.20
Although these requirements may appear to be onerous, they are construed liberally in
favor of claimants, and are required by the statute to be construed in such a way as to favor
access to the courts. 21 Additionally, the Florida legislature’s stated intent is to enhance judicial
economy. To that end, the notice requirements allow for extensive pre-suit investigation prior to
the initiation of formal discovery, and have the additional benefit of encouraging settlement
between the parties.22
A further protection against frivolity is the requirement of a verified expert affidavit.
This affidavit is required to be produced by the plaintiff as part of the pre-suit investigation
procedure 23 , and requires a medical professional under oath to assert that the claim against the
defendant is meritorious in nature. 24

18

Fl. Stat. § 766.102 et. seq
Blom v. Adventurist Health System/Sunbelt, Inc., 911 So.2d 211 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005).
20 § 766.106(2)(a).
21 Arch Plaza, Inc. v. Perpall, 947 So. 2d 476 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006); Fassy v. Crowley, 884 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 2d DCA
2004); Integrated Health Care Services, Inc. v. Lang-Redway, 840 So. 2d 974 (Fla. 2002).
22 Michael v. Medical Staffing Network, Inc., 947 So. 2d 614 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007); Apostolico v. Orlando Regional
Health Care Systems, Inc., 871 So. 2d 283 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004); Kukral v. Mekras, 679 So. 2d 278 (Fla. 1996).
23 See Largie v. Gregorian, 913 So. 2d 635 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005).
24 Ibid.
19

In furtherance of its goal of promoting judicial economy, in April 2013, the Florida
legislature passed into law a more controversial measure, known as Florida Statute § 766.106525 ,
which would further enhance these pre-existing notice provisions.
C. – Florida Statute § 766.1065
Section 766.1065, titled “Authorization for release of protected health information,” was
passed into law on April 12, 2013, going into effect in July of that year. 26 This Act requires that
the pre-suit notices under § 766.106.2, discussed above, must also be accompanied by an
authorization for the release of medical records. 27 This authorization is specifically worded to
include any health information of potential relevance to the plaintiff’s claim from any provider,
and goes so far as to say that any pre-suit notice under § 766.106.2 that does not include this
notice is hereafter void. 28 Further, if at any point this authorization is revoked, it is deemed
under the statute to be retroactively void from the date it was signed, not only effectively ending
the suit itself, but also any tolling under the statute of limitations. 29
In addition to any written records relating to the claimant’s alleged injuries, the statute also
requires plaintiffs to authorize the release of “verbal health information as well as written health
information” in the custody of any health care provider who has treated the plaintiff for the
injuries complained of, or any health care provider who has seen the plaintiff in the two years
preceding the alleged malpractice. 30 This section goes beyond the disclosure requirements of the
Texas statute at issue In Re: Collins, M.D., in that even if a plaintiff deems a healthcare
provider’s services to be irrelevant to the claims asserted, she is still required to disclose that she

25

Fl. Stat § 766.1065(1).
Ibid.
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 Fl. Stat § 766.1065(2).
30 Barbara Busharis, Medical Malpractice Reform Meets Hipaa, Trial Advoc. Q., Fall 2013, at 4.
26

received treatment. 31 This oral information disclosure was included for the purpose of allowing
ex parte interviews of plaintiff’s treating physicians by the defendants’ attorneys and their staff.32
In short, the statute allows health care providers who might be deposed, called as witnesses
or named as defendants in medical negligence actions to disclose patients' confidential medical
information and records to a defendant’s attorneys. 33 While on its face, the statute itself
undoubtedly contributes to Florida’s scheme of judicial economy through notice and pre-suit
investigation, what about the privacy of the plaintiff?

What about a patient’s rights under

HIPAA?
D. – HIPAA
The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 34 , or HIPAA, for short,
was enacted on August 21, 1996 as Congress' response to the need for wide–reaching reform of
the health care industry. 35 Originally passed out of concerns regarding the portability of
insurance for people unable to switch jobs for fear of denial due to pre-existing health issues, the
Act allows for the creation of rules and regulations by the Department of Health and Human
Services. 36 These regulations, particularly those codified in 45 C.F.R. § 164 et seq., have become
known primarily for enabling the passage of extensive patient privacy regulations.37

31

Fl. Stat. § 766.1065(3).
2013 WL 1775986 (WJMEDMAL).
33 2013 WL 1775986 (WJMEDMAL).
34 45 C.F.R. §164.508.
35 Arons v. Jutkowitz, 9 N.Y.3d 393, 850 N.Y.S.2d 345, 880 N.E.2d 831, 839–40 (2007); Pub.L. No. 104–191, 110
Stat.1936 (1996); See also In re Collins, 286 S.W.3d 911, 917 (Tex. 2009).
36 See SUMMARY OF T HE HIPAA PRIVACY RULE , http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/priva
cy/hipaa/understanding/summary/privacysummary.pdf (last visited February 17, 2015).
37 194 A.L.R. Fed. 133, Validity, Construction, and Application of Health Insurance Portability and Accountability
Act of 1996 (HIPAA) and Regulations Promulgated Thereunder.
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HIPAA binds any health care provider, but only if that provider transmits any
information in an electronic form. 38 This information, known as Protected Health Information,
or “PHI”, and is relevant under HIPAA if it contains individually identifiable health
information. 39 The use, disclosure or distribution of any of this information is allowed only
through methods authorized by HIPAA’s accompanying regulations.40
Although the plaintiff In Re Collins claimed the Texas Statute conflicted with HIPAA,
the latest wave of legislation similar to Florida Statute § 766.1065 had never been tested in an
action before the Federal courts. 41 That challenge would come in the form of Murphy v. Dulay,42
in which the District and Circuit Court came to very different conclusions, crystallizing the
debate about the utility of such laws, and their underlying purposes.
III.

Murphy v. Dulay (District Court)
Plaintiff, Glen Murphy, (originally pled as “John Doe”) was a former patient of the

defendants, Adolfo C. Dulay, and his professional association. 43 In addition to Dr. Adolfo and
his practice, the State of Florida intervened as a defendant because Mr. Murphy chose to
challenge the validity of Section 766.1065. 44 The underlying facts of the suit were fairly
straightforward: Dulay attempted to bring a suit and retained the required experts in various
specialties; however, he refused to provide the authorization for ex parte interviews and
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See SUMMARY OF T HE HIPAA PRIVACY RULE , http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/priva
cy/hipaa/understanding/summary/privacysummary.pdf (last visited February 17, 2015).
39 Ibid.
40 Ibid.
41 Georgia’s Supreme Court also faced a similar challenge to a similar law in Allen v. Wright, 282 Ga. 9, 644 S.E.2d
814 (Ga.2007), which it allowed to stand relying largely on similar logic to the Texas Supreme Court.
42 Murphy v. Dulay, 975 F. Supp. 2d 1200, 1201 (N.D. Fla. 2013)
43 Id. at 1201.
44 Id. at 1202.

communication with his healthcare providers, and stated he would not give the required notices
under § 766.106 unless the court ruled in his favor.45
Defendant first argued that Murphy did not have standing, because the federal district court
can only grant declaratory and injunctive relief in the event of imminent harm, and Plaintiff’s
potential harm, the release of his protected health records, was speculative. 46 However, the
District Court sided with Plaintiff, finding that a cognizable injury could occur through the
inability of a litigant to have access to the courts. 47 Additionally, the court bolstered this finding
with the determination that a real injury sufficient to allow a claim to go forward occurs when an
ex parte interview that illegally discloses protected information is undertaken. 48 The court stated
that “either of these injuries can be redressed in this action by an order prohibiting Dr. Dulay,
and those acting in concert with him, from conducting the interviews”, and therefore the
requested relief was appropriate.49
Defendant next argued that the threat of injury via the ex parte interviews was purely
speculative, as the statute only provided for, but did not compel, the interviews to take place.50
However, the court looked to the record, and found that Dr. Dulay, through his statements, had
asserted his right to conduct ex parte interviews, and would not agree to foregoing such a right if
he was successful. 51 Further, Defendants’ attempts to argue that disclosures of protected
information would occur regardless of the case through the inevitable course of discovery were
unpersuasive to the court:

45

Ibid.; The court notes however that plaintiff had already secured experts, which suggests he was sincere in
bringing the medical malpractice suit. The court appears to be implying this is not a test case because of this fact.
46 See e.g. Atlanta Gas Light Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 68 F.3d 409, 414 (11th Cir. 1995).
47 Murphy, 975 F. Supp.2d at 1203.
48 Ibid.
49 Ibid.
50 Ibid.
51 Ibid.

If an ex parte interview occurs, most of the disclosed information will be
information for which any state- law privilege—as distinct from any limitation on
disclosure under HIPAA—will have been waived by the assertion of the medicalnegligence claim. Still, it is a reasonable possibility—though uncertain—that the
disclosed information also will include information that is not pertinent to the
medical- negligence claim and for which the state- law privilege thus will not have
been waived.52
Through this finding, the court recognized the existence of imminent harm, and therefore
standing for the plaintiff, allowing it to reach the merits of the claim. 53
The court then discussed Defendants’ arguments that Mr. Murphy had no private right of
action under HIPAA, and therefore lacked standing. 54 . Because of its earlier determination that
declaratory and injunctive relief were appropriate to ensure no harm in violation of Plaintiff’s
Federal rights occurred, the court again insisted upon Murphy possessing standing, not under
HIPAA, but under the Supremacy Clause 55 The District court explained that the Eleventh
Circuit has a tradition of honoring claims for declaratory or injunctive relief under the
Supremacy Clause, with the Supreme Court affirming its decision to do so in Douglas v.
Independent Living Center Of Southern California 56 , despite a “vigorous dissent” by four
Justices. 57 Here, the court framed Murphy’s actions as an attempt to preemptively assert a
defense to his inability to comply with both the Florida and Federal laws. 58
Reaching the merits, the court first cites to the preemption rule contained within HIPAA,
which provides that a “standard, requirement, or implementation specification adopted under this

52

Murphy, supra, 975 F. Supp.2d at 1204.
Id. at 1203-1204.
54 Id. at 1204; HIPAA historically has been interpreted as not providing for a private right of action.
55 Ibid; The court also supports its decision by invoking the Supremacy Clause, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the
Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201.
56 Douglas v. Independent Living Center Of Southern California, 132 S.Ct. 1204, 1213
57 Murphy, 975 F. Supp. 2d at 1205; Douglas v. Independent Living Center Of Southern California, 132 S.Ct. 1204,
1213.
58 Murphy, 975 F. Supp. 2d at 1205.
53

subchapter that is contrary to a provision of State law preempts the provision of State law.”59
The court then addresses the applicable section, 45 C.F.R. § 164.508(a)(1): “Except as otherwise
permitted or required by this subchapter, a covered entity may not use or disclose protected
health information without an authorization that is valid under this section.”60 Because a doctor
is a covered entity, and the health information (i.e. a patient’s medical history) is the kind that
would be shared in the ex parte proceedings envisioned by the drafters of § 766.1065, the court
reasoned that in order for the law to remain valid and avoid preemption it must either: (1) be
permitted by 45 C.F.R. § 164.508(c); or, (2) such disclosures must be consistent with a valid
authorization.61
45 C.F.R. § 164.508(c) makes reference to 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(e), which states that “a
disclosure can be made in connection with a judicial or administrative proceeding”, but such
disclosures must be in response to a court or administrative order. 62 The court viewed this
requirement as more restrictive than the Florida statute. 63 According to the District court, the
statute “takes a court or administrative tribunal out of the process altogether.” 64 The court states
that this is not an effort to comply with federal requirements, but rather an attempt to dispense
with them entirely, giving a patient no judicial recourse in advance of disclosure. 65 For the
District court, this is a violation of § 164.512(e), because that section requires that if no such
order is obtained, the patient must have the ability to object, with a judicial or administrative

59

Id. at 1206; 45 C.F.R. § 160.203.
45 C.F.R. § 164.508(a)(1).
61 Murphy, 975 F. Supp. 2d at 1206.
62 Ibid.
63 Ibid.
64 Id. at 1206-1207.
65 Id. at 1207.
60

ruling deciding the matter.

66

Absent section (e), the District Court states, the only other option

is valid authorization by the patient.
According to the court, a valid authorization by a patient allowing disclosures can be
acceptable even if such authorization relates to judicial or administrative proceeding, but does
not meet all of the requirements of 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(e).67 In the court’s analysis, the Florida
Statute has all of the required elements to make an authorization valid; however, the statute lacks
the voluntary nature necessary to be truly legitimate. 68 In the court’s view “the whole point of
the authorization provision is to recognize that a patient may consent to disclosures that
otherwise would be impermissible . . . [t]he signature confirms that the patient in fact
consents.”69 For the court, the signature required by the Florida statute does not show consent; it
shows “mandated compliance” with the law, not knowing and voluntary consent to disclosures. 70
The District court views “the authorization [a]s a charade; the only entity granting authority, in
any meaningful sense is the state itself, not the patient.” 71

The court then concludes that the

Florida law is squarely at odds with the Federal scheme, as it attempts to circumvent it by
requiring ex parte interviews without consent, without a court order or administrative order and
the protections such a proceeding entails. 72
The Court in closing notes the Texas Supreme Court reached the opposite decision, in
what it believes to be a decision contrary to federal law. 73 This interpretation of HIPAA, and this
conversation about what is voluntary and what is mandated, form the core of the disagreement

66

Ibid.
Murphy, 975 F. Supp.2d at 1207, citing § 164.512(e)(v i)(2).
68 Murphy, 975 F. Supp.2d at 1207.
69 Ibid.
70 Ibid.
71 Id. at 1208.
72 Ibid.
73 Ibid.
67

between the District and Circuit courts, and ultimately would lead to a reversal of the District
Court’s decision.
IV.

Murphy v. Dulay (Appeal to the 11th Circuit)
In late 2014, the appeal of the above case was heard in the Eleventh Circuit, which reversed

and remanded the decision of the District court. 74 Primarily, the Eleventh Circuit took issue with
what it viewed as a narrow view of § 766.1065, and related notice provisions passed by the
Florida legislature.75
While the District court focused specifically on the negatives of the law, the Circuit court
noted that Florida law had already required that the defendant and his insurer in medical
malpractice suits engage in a thorough investigation within a proscribed 90-day period in order
to determine the liability of the defendant. 76 After this investigational period, the defendant is
required to do one of three things: deny fault, settle, or request arbitration. 77 The Eleventh
Circuit views this as a good thing, as its purpose is not to dissuade meritorious claims from being
filed, but instead to promote judicial economy and prevent protracted and expensive discovery.78
The court thus views §766.1065 as being simply another mechanism through which a more
thorough review can be facilitated prior to any substantial judicial involvement between the
potential litigants.79
To bolster its benign view of the statute, the Circuit Court gives the three primary functions
of § 766.1065. First, the court notes that under § 766.1065, a prospective p laintiff is required to
list all providers from two years prior to the actions giving rise to the claim; however, Plaintiff
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Murphy v. Dulay, 768 F.3d 1360, 1363 (11th Cir. 2014).
Id. at 1365; See also Murphy v. Dulay, 975 F. Supp. 2d 1200, 1204 (N.D. Fla. 2013).
76 Murphy, supra, 768 F.3d at 1365; see also Fl. Stat. 766.106(3)(a).
77 Fl. Stat. 766.106(3)(a).
78 Murphy, supra, 768 F.3d at 1365.
79 Ibid.
75

has the option to certify that a provider did not provide services relevant to the claim, and
therefore prevent the sharing of his or her entire medical history. 80 Second, although the statute
allows for ex parte interviews with plaintiff’s healthcare providers, those providers are not
obligated to submit to interviews with defendant, his lawyer, or insurers. 81 Finally, the court
states that the form plaintiff must submit, pursuant to the statute, must include an express waiver
of HIPAA, and notes that the waiver, as well as the form itself, is revocable at any time. 82
Following this overview of the way the statute is meant to operate, the court moves on to analyze
the possibility that § 766.1065 is pre-empted by HIPAA.
A. – Judicial Process Exemption
The court begins by stating its conclusion that both the judicial process exception, as well
as the authorized waiver exception, allow for the Florida Statute to survive a pre-emption
analysis and remain valid. 83 This analysis differs markedly from that of the district court,
discussed above, which found explicitly that neither exception applied.
45 C.F.R. § 164.512 provides that protected health information may be shared without
waiver if such disclosure is part of a judicial process. 84 Specifically, those disclosures must be
made either as a result of a court order or order of an administrative tribunal, or subpoena,
discovery request, or other lawful process. 85 Even when such an order is obtained, the Circuit
Court continues, the party seeking protected information is still required to give notice to the
individual, and allow that individual the opportunity to obtain a protective order. 86 HIPAA’s

80

Id. at 1365.
Ibid.
82 Ibid.
83 Id. at 1369.
84 45 CFR § 164.512 ("[a] covered entity may use or disclose protected health information without the written
authorization of the individual, as described in § 164.508 . . . in the situations covered by this section . . . ."; Murphy,
supra, 768 F.3d at 1369.
85 45 CFR § 164.512(e)(1)(i-ii); Murphy, supra, 768 F.3d at 1369.
86 45 CFR § 164.512(e)(1)(ii).” Murphy, supra, 768 F.3d at 1369.
81

regulations further provide that these efforts be undertaken good faith. 87 The Circuit court finds
that “[c]learly, § 766.1065 does not provide the same privacy safeguards as those called for in
the judicial-process exception” in all cases, though it could be applicable in so me instances.88
However, because 45 C.F.R. § 164.512 provides that the judicial exception only applies where
written authorization of the individual cannot be obtained, the statute could still be valid under
the waiver exception.
B. – Waiver Issues.
Turning next to the issue of waiver, the court notes:
“The HIPAA regulations specify that, to be valid, an authorization must contain
these elements: (1) "[a] description of the information to be used or disclosed that
identifies the information in a specific and meaningful fashion"; (2) "[t]he name
or other specific identification of the person(s), or class of persons, authorized to
make the requested use or disclosure"; (3) "[t]he name or other specific
identification of the person(s), or class of persons, to whom the covered entity
may make the requested use or disclosure"; (4) "[a] description of each purpose of
the requested use or disclosure"; (5) "[a]n expiration date or an expiration event
that relates to the individual or the purpose of the use or disclos ure"; and (6) the
"[s]ignature of the individual and date."”89
In addition, the party authorizing disclosure is also required to have notice that he or she
will have the right at any time to revoke; not be required to sign such a waiver as a condition of
continuing coverage; and be reminded that re-disclosure to other parties could result, with such
re-disclosure not covered by HIPAA.90
With HIPAA’s waiver provision in mind, the Court addresses Murphy’s arguments, and
holds that the authorizations of 766.1065 meet HIPAA’s requirements. 91 The Circuit Court first
disagrees with Murphy’s assertion that the authorization is not revocable, and finds authorization
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45 CFR §164.512(e)(1)(iii), (iv); Murphy, 768 F.3d at 1369 -70.
Murphy, 768 F.3d at 1375.
89 45 CFR § 164.508(c)(1)(i)-(vi); Murphy, 768 F.3d at 1370.
90 45 § 164.508(c)(2), (b)(4); Murphy, supra, 768 F.3d at 1370.
91 Murphy,768 F.3d at 1372.
88

is revocable at any time. 92 The court notes that the result of revocation is simply the termination
of a lawsuit, which, it admits, could result in the elimination of Plaintiff’s claim. 93 However,
“the HIPAA regulations do not require that a person be able to revoke an authorization free of
any consequences; they just require that an authorization be revocable. The Florida statute
requires the same”.94
Next, the court addresses Murphy’s argument that disclosure of the identities of health
care providers beyond the parties to the plaintiff’s action is a HIPAA violation. 95 This claim is
also dismissed by the Circuit Court, which states that “superfluous” information naming doctors
not relevant to the lawsuit does not invalidate the authorization under the act. 96 As the court
explains, HIPAA does not require a purpose, legitimate or otherwise, for the disclosure of a
patient’s entire history under the waiver provision.97
Third, the court turns to Murphy’s assertion below that the authorization violates
HIPAA’s specificity requirement. To this, the court simply states that,
Here, the authorization form in § 766.1065 specifically authorizes the release of
health information held by health care providers that the plaintiff identifies,
including those who have examined, evaluated, or treated him (or who will do so)
in connection with the complained-of injury; and those who have examined,
evaluated, or treated him two years prior to the injury. Fla. Stat. § 766.1065(3)(B).
Murphy may not like the breadth of the authorization required by § 766.1065, but
the HIPAA regulations do not require that authorizations be narrow, simply that
they be specific.98
Next, the court addresses Murphy’s argument that the consent to disclose protected medical
information acts as a “compound authorization” when combined with the required 90 day pre-
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Id. at 1373.
Ibid.
94 Ibid.
95 Ibid.
96 Ibid.
97 Ibid.
98 Id. at 1374.
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suit notice. 99 “Compound authorizations” are defined as authorizations for the disclosure of
protected health information that are combined with any other authorization. 100 As an example,
the court states that an authorization to disclose protected health information combined with an
informed consent to receive treatment or pay benefits to a provider would represent a compound
authorization. 101 The court states that the pre-suit notice is a condition precedent to the filing of a
medical malpractice action in Florida, and one which pre-existed § 766.1065, and is separate
from any authorization. 102 The fact that both are required to be submitted at the same moment in
time does not mean the two documents are combined so as to create compound authorization.103
By holding that the requirements comport with the authorization provisions of HIPAA, “no other
HIPAA exception for disclosure needs to be satisfied once an individual signs a valid written
authorization.”104
Ultimately, the court dismisses Murphy’s penultimate argument that the notice is mandatory, and
thereby invalid. The court first explains that the HIPAA Statute does not say that any mandatory
disclosure, other than the conditioning of treatment upon the signing of a release, is prohibited.105
Such explicit prohibitions therefore suggest that requiring HIPAA authorizations under other
circumstances is permissible. 106 Next, the court notes Murphy’s decision to file suit in the State’s
judicial system is voluntary, and therefore his authorization is not mandatory. 107 Finally, the
Court points to the decision of the Texas Supreme Court In Re: Collins, which, as discussed
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above, upheld a similar legislative scheme, 108 relying primarily on the fact that the decision to
file suit is not mandatory. 109 Additionally, the regulations have been revised several times since
the Texas Supreme Court’s decision. 110 The Circuit suggests that this is evidence of the statutes
legitimacy, because if Congress is aware of a contradictory interpretation of Federal law, yet
does not change that law, the courts will presume that when it is re-enacted without change that
the judicial decision is valid.111
V –Argument.
The District court was correct to hold the HIPAA preempts the Florida statute, as none of
the exceptions for the disclosure of protected health information under the HIPAA privacy rules
are applicable to § 766.1065. The Eleventh Circuit’s analysis in the Dulay case incorrectly
differentiates between what is voluntary and what is required when addressing the issue of
waiver pursuant to HIPAA, and incorrectly states that the judicial exception may apply in certain
instances. The Circuit court frames the choice to authorize disclosure of PHI in terms of
voluntariness, yet under the Florida statute plaintiffs will be required to waive their rights to
privacy pursuant to HIPAA’s regulations in order to bring an actionable claim for medical
malpractice.
As the District court correctly identified, the Florida legislature in passing § 766.1065
effectively side steps the regulatory safe guards put in place by HIPAA’s privacy rule,
specifically the judicial exception 112 and the minimal disclosure standard. 113 Further, § 766.1065
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frustrates the purpose of the HIPAA privacy regulations, as well as the overall legislative
purpose behind HIPAA.114
A. - The Judicial Exception.
The District court’s holds that the “judicial exception” to the HIPAA privacy rule does
not apply to the Florida statute. 115 The Circuit court, however, holds that in some cases the
judicial exception would apply under § 766.1065, allowing the statute to survive its preemption
analysis. 116 The District court was correct to hold that the judicial exception does not apply under
any circumstances, because under the Florida statute claimants are required to disclose more than
the minimum necessary information, 117 and are not offered the opportunity to secure a protective
order118 , in contradiction of the HIPAA privacy regulations.
The judicial exception, found in 45 C.F.R. 164.512(e), states that a covered individual
may disclose otherwise protected information as the result of any judicial or administrative order,
or as a result of a subpoena or discovery so long as the subject has (1) received notice and
consented, or (2) the subject has the ability to seek a protective order. 119 This portion of the
regulations has traditionally been the mechanism through which defendants have sought to
conduct ex parte interviews in medical malpractice litigation. 120 The judicial exception is a well
articulated, well defined series of regulations, addressing the process for disclosing protected
information before, during and after litigation, whether this information is in the form of
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documents or interviews. 121 As a result of the extensive regulations, and the case law that has
interpreted them, the judicial exception requires considerable involvement from the courts in
order to effectively control the flow of information, and ensure its relevance to the litigation at
issue through the issuance of protective orders, if need be. Because the Florida statute offers no
mechanism for obtaining a protective order, and lacks any mechanism for impartial decisions on
the relevance of protected information, it entirely ignores the safeguards set forth in the
regulations under 45 C.F.R. 164.512(e).
Additionally, the lack of protections in the Florida statute to ensure that only limited,
relevant information is released adds to the inapplicability of the judicial exception to § 766.1065,
and undermines the very purpose of the HIPAA regulations. Because § 766.1065 requires
prospective plaintiffs to provide the names and dates of visit to all healthcare providers within a
two-year period prior to the litigation, 122 the statute violates HIPAA’s minimum necessary
standard. Because this minimum necessary standard applies to information released via the
judicial exception, it is impossible for the Florida statute to survive HIPAA preemption under
this provision. 45 C.F.R. 164.502(b) states that “[w]hen using or disclosing protected health
information or when requesting protected health information from another covered entity . . . a
covered entity . . . must make reasonable efforts to limit protected health information to the
minimum necessary to accomplish the intended purpose of the use, disclosure, or request.”123
The Florida statute, as per both the Circuit and District courts’ findings, pro vides for no such
limiting feature, in that it requires the names and dates of visit of all health care providers seen
by the plaintiff in a two-year period.124
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§ 766.1065 further complicates the limiting of disclosures, because, as the regulations
state, once privacy is waived 125 , the personal information is subject to re-disclosure without any
of the protections of the HIPAA privacy rule. 126 This means that in order to bring suit, a plaintiff
would be required to waive their rights under HIPAA’s privacy regulations, resulting in PHI of
no relevance to the suit being released in perpetuity.
These features of § 766.1065 are directly at odds not only with the regulations themselves,
but also with the regulatory purpose of the HIPAA privacy rules. As the Departme nt of Health
and Human Services, through its Office of Human Rights, the body responsible for regulating
and enforcing HIPAA’s privacy rule has stated, the privacy rule is designed to strike a balance
between disclosable information and the privacy rights of the individual. 127 The Florida statute
ignores this balance. As noted by the District court, this lack of oversight and balance, as
provided by the judicial exception, means that in order to survive preemption the statute is
entirely dependant upon the waiver exception contained within the regulations.
B. - Voluntary Waiver.
The Circuit court ultimately held that the Florida statute provides for a valid waiver of the
protections provided by the HIPAA regulations. This is not the case, however, as the waiver is
not voluntary, as the Circuit court suggests. The District court was correct to hold that such a
waiver is defective; the voluntary nature of waivers is negated where mandatory compliance is
required as a pre-requisite to the filing of a suit. 128 The District court was right to find that just as
a HIPAA waiver would be deemed invalid if signed by an incompetent person, or a person “with
a gun to their head, for example”, the requirement that claimants provide a signed authorization
125
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for the sharing of protected health information or have their claims dismissed, negates the
voluntary nature of the waiver.129
The Circuit court rejects concerns about the purposes or protections of HIPAA’s privacy
regulations, focusing instead on the waiver “catch all” contained within those regulations. 130 It
relies specifically on the reasoning of the Collins decision, which the District court rejected as
“contrary to federal law”. 131 Both Texas’ Supreme Court in Collins and the Circuit Court
premise their argument on the concept that filing suit in order to gain redress in medical
malpractice actions is a voluntary act, 132 and the decision not to file a claim in an otherwise
meritorious suits is an acceptable alternative according to the legislative scheme. 133 Based on the
Eleventh Circuit’s own definition of what is voluntary, however, a prospective plaintiff’s waiver
of their rights under HIPAA’s privacy rule is not voluntary, but required.
In defining the term “voluntary” in previous cases regarding waiver of protected
information134 , the Eleventh Circuit has used the plain meaning, defining the term using Black’s
Law Dictionary. 135 As stated therein, “voluntary” is defined as “1. Done by design or intention
<voluntary act>” and “2. Unconstrained by interference; not impelled by outside influence
<voluntary statement>.” 136 Using the Eleventh Circuit’s own definition, the waiver of a
plaintiff’s rights under HIPAA’s privacy regulations are anything but voluntary. As the District
court was correct to state, the threat of either alternative is enough to cause duress, by essentially
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“holding a gun to the head” of a prospective plaintiff. 137 By threatening a complete bar to
recovery through failure to provide information to defendant, both relevant and irrelevant and
without any judicial redress, the Florida statute compels individuals to involuntary action.
The District court was correct to hold that the § 766.1065 not only violates HIPAA’s
privacy regulations, but also effectively requires authorization of protected information through
the creation of duress. The Circuit Court, using its very own definition of voluntary, was wrong
to find that the waivers called for by the Florida statute are valid.
V - Waiver of the Right to Trial by Jury
A further argument against § 766.1065 not addressed by either court is that the statute
restricts the right of litigant to a trial by jury. The suppression of the right of individuals to
receive redress for their otherwise actionable injuries violates both the Seventh Amendment of
the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 22 of the Florida State Constitution.
A. – The Waiver is Not Voluntary.
The Circuit Court’s decision, like Collins before it, hinges on the determination that an
individual can be made to choice between privacy protections under HIPAA, or “voluntary”
waiver his or her day in court. Such a reading of the Florida statute ignores the constitutional
guarantees to trial by jury expressed in the United States and Florida State Constitutions. Both
the Florida and federal courts have held that this right is fundamental in both case law and their
rules of civil procedure. 138 Additionally, both Florida and federal courts have held that every
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reasonable inference against the waiver of this right is the rule, and not the exception, and that
waiver must be made knowingly and voluntarily. 139
Using the Eleventh Circuits definition of voluntary, discussed above, it is clear that the
waiver of a claimant’s right to trial by jury under the statute does not meet the necessary
constitutional standards. Just as the waiver argument failed in the context o f the HIPAA privacy
regulations because the decision to authorize disclosures was compelled by outside influence, it
also fails in the context of waiver of the right to trial by jury. The waiver, as contemplated by
both the Circuit Court and the Texas Supreme Court, is compelled by duress in the form of the
threat of disclosure of non-relevant PHI in perpetuity, in direct violation of HIPAA’s privacy
regulations.
Neither the District court nor the Circuit court addressed whether the Florida statute was
unconstitutional, focusing only on preemption. Constitutional arguments could be valuable in
challenging the statute, and others like it, in the future. Particularly under state constitutions,
such arguments have proven effective in the past when used to challenge tort reform measures,
and could offer a viable path to challenging § 766.1065 in the future.
B. - Future Challenges to § 766.1065 at the State Level
The argument that the statute violates the right to trial by jury, specifically under state
constitutions, has been used with mixed results in the past to challenge other tort reform
measures. For example, limits to damage awards in medical malpractice actions 140 have
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previously been challenged as infringing upon ones right to a trial by jury. 141 When confronted
with this argument, analysis of state constitutions has led to different decisions by different state
supreme courts. For example, Missouri struck down its damage cap on these grounds in Watts v.
Lester E. Cox Medical Centers in 2012. 142 However, on a similar case out of Kansas, its Supreme
Court upheld its statute, relying, in similar fashion to the Texas Supreme Court in Collins on the
public policy concerns of increasing access to healthcare and mitigating the rising costs of
malpractice insurance.143
Adding to the possible weight a Florida court could give to this argument, the Kansas and
Missouri Courts have shown similarities to the Florida Supreme Court when expressing their
legal analytical framework for determining how rights under their state co nstitutions will be
interpreted. For example, Kansas and Missouri’s Supreme Courts have stated that the right to
trial by jury is traditionally construed to require the right to a jury trial to be viewed in the
context of what was meant at the time of the passing of the constitution. 144 Florida’s courts have
also interpreted their constitution in a similar fashion. 145 The interpretive similarities suggest that
a challenge to the Florida statute premised on the right to trial by jury would be a powerful
argument, just as it was before the Kansas and Missouri Courts.
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While this argument has been used to challenge tort cap laws with mixed results, it could
prove very useful in challenging statutes such as § 766.1065, which call for a waiver of the
ability to seek redress in court all together. 146 In the context of § 766.1065, Florida courts have
consistently held that the State Constitution, in its 1968 form, is strongly committed to the right
of its citizens to have their wrongs addressed in a trial by jury. 147 This leads to the question of
whether such a claim brought in state court could invalidate the Florida statute, or those like it,
without addressing HIPAA and preemption at all?
V- Conclusions
Florida Statute § 766.1065, is part of a long history of attempts to regulate medical
malpractice actions in the interests of judicial economy, lessening the cost and increasing the
availability of health care. As many of the decisions discussed above relate, there is a real public
policy concern in ensuring that these interests are realized through legislation.
The Florida Statute, as the District court correctly held, gives too much power to
defendants with too little judicial oversight. The Florida statute also fails to provide for voluntary
waiver, while calling for the release of non-relevant PHI. Its provisions, and the Circuit Court’s
opinion, twist understandings of what is voluntary and what is required when discussing waiver
under HIPAA’s privacy regulations. The Circuit court further errs by allowing, through its
holding, violation of Federal and State Constitutional rights in order to advance the public policy
concerns of judicial economy, speed and control of costs.
Although the rising cost of healthcare, and concerns of access arguably make necessary
such statutory measures, these concerns do not change federal law. By allowing for judicial
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oversight, protective orders, and determinations of relevance made not by the parties themselves,
but by a neutral magistrate, HIPAA’s regulations ensure fairness while accomplishing the very
same goals and policy concerns.
Additionally, under HIPAA’s regulatory framework, constitutional rights are preserved.
Access to the courts is preserved, as the plaintiff in such cases gets the benefits of a judicially
overseen process, while allowing defendants the ability to conduct their own internal
investigations as envisioned by the Florida statute.
The District Court was correct to strike down the Florida Statute. Although its decision
was reversed by the Circuit Court, viable challenges to the statute still exist, and have proven
effective in the past. Further, other options that correctly balance public policy concerns and the
rights of patients should be considered in order to strike the correct balance of protection for all
parties, and ensure compliance with the existing HIPAA privacy regulations.

